Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta Page 11
“For about two hours, I heard them moving about and talking all around me, then I heard someone above me giving orders over a radio. I remained in this position for about two more hours and then started moving toward the area I had picked on the map for a pick up. I arrived just above this area and about 1700 hours a FAC flew over and I fired a white flare at him. At approximately 1730 I saw four armed helicopters flying in the area and I then fired two white and two red flares at them. I also threw a yellow smoke grenade into the clearing at which time the chopper came in and exfiltrated me.”25
During all of this activity air operations were extremely dangerous and limited by heavy rain and low cloud cover. Major Beckwith, in his infamous style, reasoned that if he could get on the ground with one of the teams then Project Delta would have more leverage to get the support that was not forthcoming from the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).1 At the first opportunity, he boarded a helicopter and flew at treetop level into the team areas. Forced to fly low by the cloud cover he became first, an easy target and second, a casualty of heavy ground fire. He sustained a wound through his abdomen from a machine gun round. Grievously wounded, Major Beckwith was evacuated and spent many long months recuperating.1 Air and ground searches were conducted for the missing men and for SSG Frank Badolati’s body to no avail.
Frank Badolati’s name is inscribed on Panel 04E, Line 105 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.
Marlin Cook’s name is inscribed on Panel 04E, Line 106 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.
Donald Dotson’s name is inscribed on Panel 04E, Line 107 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.
The names of Cecil Hodgson, Jesse Hancock and George Hoagland are inscribed on Panel 04E, Line 109 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.
Ronald Terry’s name is inscribed on Panel 04E, Line 116 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.
CHAPTER VIII: REGROUP AND RECOVERY
On February 1st, what was left of Project Delta returned to Nha Trang to regroup and rebuild. The devastating losses of Operation Masher/White Wing would have a lasting effect on the way Project Delta conducted business. Over the course of the next six operations, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Warren would take Project Delta through its last major developmental evolution to assume the form and organization that would define it for the rest of its existence. During the next few months Project Delta grew to perhaps its largest size in terms of numbers of U.S advisors assigned.
After one month of rebuilding, Project Delta undertook an operation in support of the 23rd ARVN Division at Ban Me Thuot.26 In the intervening month since the Bong Son operation the 145th Airlift Platoon (UH-1B Slicks) was consolidated with the 6th Aviation Platoon (UH-1B Gunships) to form the 2nd Platoon, 171st Aviation Company. The 171st AC was attached to 5th Special Forces Group, Nha Trang, The primary mission of the 2nd Platoon became supporting Project Delta and its reconnaissance training activity conducted from Delta’s headquarters in Nha Trang. Delta continued to have Captains Kerr and Ahmann attached as FACs. LT Col. Warren, determined not to repeat mistakes recognized from previous operations, played a key role in determining areas of operation, methods of operation, deployment of troops, and identification of key support functions for immediate reaction forces. Project Delta deployed two Airborne Ranger Companies, one with a reconnaissance in force mission, the other with immediate reaction responsibility for any recon team needing assistance. The recon team size was reestablished at two U.S. advisors and six indigenous personnel. In a move reminiscent of the early days of Leaping Lena, several recon teams consisting of all indigenous personnel were formed. These four man teams were dressed and armed like the enemy26 and had the capability of communicating with headquarters to call for air assistance. These teams were called Roadrunners.
On March 7th, 1966, Teams 7 (SFC Paul Tracy and CPL Joe Alderman), 8 (SSG Charles Gray and SFC Austin Bounds), and 11 (SSG Donald Hannah and SSG Clarence Lovejoy) were inserted into their respective AOs northeast of Ban Me Thuot. All three teams were extracted on the 11th. No enemy contacts or sightings occurred although plentiful evidence existed of past occupation by sizeable forces.26 The 3rd Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion conducted a reconnaissance in force on March 9th and 10th with no contact made with the enemy. Three Roadrunner teams were inserted on March 10th with one day missions planned. These early Roadrunner missions involved insertion early in the morning with plans to follow a set path of march and be extracted in the afternoon.
Teams 1 and 2 completed their mission without any enemy sightings. Team 3 made contact with the enemy a total of three times resulting in three enemy KIA. The third contact was with an unknown number of soldiers outside an encampment of an estimated 100 to 200 enemy. This contact caused the team to split. The point man was picked up later on the 10th and another man was picked up on the morning of the 11th. The other two team members were never found. The operation was terminated by a message from MACV ordering the Project to remove all assets from the field and report to I Corps to support Camp Ashau, which had come under enemy attack.26
Mere mention of the Ashau Valley will often evoke little more than solemn looks and silent headshakes from those who served there during the course of the war. Bounded by sheer slopes and knife peaked ridges and covered by dense high foliage, the Ashau proved to be an ideal and nearly impenetrable fortress for the invaders from the north. Convenient to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, it served as a base and assembly point for amassing troops for a major offensive into South Vietnam’s Hue-Phu Bai area, a move that could split the country in two.
Poised at the southeast end of the valley was a small Special Forces CIDG camp, A-102. Alerted to an impending enemy offensive, the camp was reinforced with a regional mobile strike force (Mike Force) on March 8th, 1966. On March 9th, the NVA attacked in force aided by low cloud cover and heavy rain which prevented effective use of air strikes. Despite inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, the camp was abandoned and overrun on March 10th with heavy losses sustained. By the time Project Delta closed on the Forward Operations Base (FOB) at Phu Bai on the 12th, the Ashau belonged to the enemy.27
Because the area had been overrun the mission became one to assess the ability and likelihood of the enemy to continue northeast toward Hue and capture the city. The reconnaissance missions focused on the areas the enemy would most likely choose to accomplish this. Because of the urgency of the situation visual aerial reconnaissance was hurriedly conducted. What followed was a series of aborted insertions because the high altitude selection of LZs precluded detection of enemy encampments, dead trees, huts, and personnel on and around the intended landing areas. Team 1 (Roland Marquis and Audley Mills) attempted a last light insertion on March 15th but could not find the LZ due to darkness. The team was inserted on March 18th on the wrong LZ. They had to move 4,000 to 5,000 meters to get into their own AO. They were extracted on March 18th, having observed small Montagnard units.27 Team 9, (Walt Shumate and Rolf Raines) aborted infiltration on March 15th due to the presence of dead trees in the middle of the LZ that prevented helicopter approach. The team was successfully inserted on the 17th and was extracted on the 20th without incident.27
Team 12 (Robert Wren and Don Landrum) attempted an insertion on March 15th and were met with enemy fire on the LZ. The helicopter engine caught fire and the pilot managed to crash land it in a nearby clearing. The team quickly gathered the helicopter crew and set up a perimeter. A rescue helicopter landed near the crashed ship and the air crew and recon team quickly boarded, with Wren on the right skid and two LLDB (Team Leader and one Team Member) on the left skid. The helicopter took off following a dry stream bed to gain altitude and when SFC Wren climbed aboard he discovered that the two LLDB had fallen from the skid. The pilot later reported that the ship was at 500 foot altitude when they fell.27
Team 10 (Chooch Chiarello and Harry Jones) infiltrated on March 17th. The LLDB Team Sergeant sprained his ankle when the team was forced to jump from the helicopter at a height of 14 feet above the LZ. On
the 18th the team called for a medevac of two LLDB team members for sprained ankles and elected to continue the mission after the evacuation took place. They were extracted on the 20th without incident.27
Team 2 (Paul Sheppard and Richard Delaney) were inserted on the wrong LZ on March 18th but continued their mission until extracted on March 22nd.27 Team 4 twice attempted insertions; on the 21st (Robert Wren and Don Landrum), and again on the 22nd (Chooch Chiarello and Harry Jones). On the 24th Team 4 (Chiarello, Jones) was shot down while inserting on the LZ. The team evacuated the crew and weapons and called for a recovery ship. The downed ship was destroyed with fragmentation grenades and the air crew and team were extracted under heavy fire. No one was injured.27
Team 3 (Charles Harper and Joe Alderman) was inserted successfully on March 21st. On the 22nd, SFC Harper collapsed from heat exhaustion and the team was extracted without incident. The team was redeployed on March 24th with Roland Marquis taking the place of Harper. The insertion was aborted due to the redirection of air assets to support the helicopter crash of Team 4.27
Team 6 (Charles Gray and Austin Bounds) was inserted on March 23rd. On the 25th the team discovered an unknown size force and called two separate air strikes on their location. The team was extracted on the 26th.27
Team 5 (Don Hannah and Clarence Lovejoy) unsuccessfully attempted insertions on March 23rd and at first light on the 24th but could find no suitable LZs. They were finally inserted at last light on the 24th at which time SSG Hannah sustained an injury to his leg while jumping from the helicopter. The team continued the mission through the 26th and became aware that they were being followed by the enemy. Hindered by the injured Hannah, the team called for extraction. Some confusion with the message coding had the extraction set up for the 27th instead of the 26th. The team hid out for the night and waited for the weather to clear on the 27th. When the recovery helicopter (a UH-1B) arrived they threw a rope ladder. Misunderstanding the radio transmission, the entire team climbed onto the ladder. Normally the team would be extracted in two lifts due to load constraints on the B-Model Hueys. The helicopter struggled to gain altitude and dragged the ladder through the trees at approximately 100 feet from the ground. The rope ladder broke, sending the two U.S. advisors and two LLDB crashing to the ground about 150 meters from the LZ. A third LLDB fell off the ladder some distance from the others. One LLDB was killed and the other badly injured. SSG Hannah was badly battered but able to administer aid to SSG Lovejoy, who was unable to walk. SSG Rolfe Raines and SSG Charles Gray descended a ladder from another helicopter and assisted with Lovejoy and the critically injured LLDB. On the 28th Gray and Raines called for stretchers to be dropped so they could carry the injured to the LZ. After making their way through the thick jungle with the injured men on stretchers, the exhausted Gray and Raines were able to have the men hoisted on stretchers and transported to the U.S. medical facility at Phu Bai.27
The 2nd and 3rd Companies, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion conducted two search and destroy missions each. Captain Holland “Time Bomb” Bynam, Senior Ranger Advisor, accompanied all four Ranger missions. 2nd Company (Bynam, LT Hamilton, SFC Scooter Davis and SSG Musselwhite) departed on the mission in a vehicle convoy. They encountered small groups of enemy and engaged them with small arms fire and air strikes.27 3rd Company (Bynam, LT Turner, SSG Coelho and SGT Benjamin) departed the FOB by wheeled vehicle on March 20th and began their mission upon reaching their departure point. The Rangers encountered small groups of enemy and engaged them, killing one and wounding four. The encountered a group of farmers and detained one for questioning. They were extracted by U.S. Marine helicopters on the 25th27. 2nd Company (Bynam, SFC Davis and SSG Musselwhite) departed the FOB by helicopter on March 23rd. They encountered two enemy and engaged them resulting in two enemy killed. They were extracted by helicopter on March 26th.27 3rd Company (Bynam, LT Turner, SFC Flores and SGT Benjamin) departed the FOB by helicopter on March 26th. The Rangers fired upon a squad of enemy resulting in one enemy wounded. They called an air strike on an estimated ten enemy with no confirmed killed. The company was extracted by helicopter on March 26th.27
A total of five Roadrunner missions were conducted between March 20th and March 23rd. Each mission was to be for one day. Two teams moved all day and were extracted with no enemy contacts or sightings. Two teams became disoriented and did not accomplish their missions before being extracted. The fifth team made contact with nine enemy while walking on a trail. They received small arms fire and fled. They evaded the enemy for the rest of the day until they were picked up by helicopter.27
III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) assigned the 1st Marine Division to conduct a large scale clearing operation with the 2nd ARVN Infantry Division near Chu Lai in April, 1966. Project Delta was tasked with reconnaissance of the area to provide intelligence on enemy locations and movements. They were requested by MAF to avoid any contact that might alert the enemy to an impending attack and cause them to alter their routines. MAF also assigned one flight of Marine Corps A-4 fighter aircraft to support the Project, but warned that they would not be used except for emergency extractions of teams in contact. This was another step toward maintaining the operational security of the planned clearing operation.28
Project Delta mobilized to Chu Lai on April 13th and 14th and prepared to insert Teams 3, 4, and 7 on the 15th. Teams 3 and 7 were inserted but Team 4 aborted after detecting activity on both their primary and secondary LZs. On April 17th attempts were made to insert Teams 8, 9, and 11. The LLDB team leaders aborted on all primary LZs, claiming the presence of enemy, campfires, or huts. The sightings were not verified by the U.S. advisors. Nonetheless, the LLDB commander refused to attempt further infiltrations into these areas claiming that they had all been compromised. LT COL. Warren unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the LLDB commander to change his mind. He then issued an order for all Project Delta personnel remaining in Nha Trang to mobilize to FOB Chu Lai and be prepared to form all U.S. teams to complete the mission. Despite the ongoing refusal of the LLDB to participate on the recon teams, two Roadrunner teams were inserted on April 18th. On the 18th seven recon teams were formed consisting of one U.S. officer and five U.S. Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). Later in the day on the 18th the LLDB commander received orders from his high command that directed him to proceed with the planned insertions of mixed U.S./LLDB teams.28
Meanwhile, Team 3 reported significant enemy sightings on April 18th and 19th and reported capturing two prisoners. They requested immediate extraction. They were engaged by the enemy and the team split. At 1800 hours on the 19th part of Team 3 including one U.S. advisor, two LLDB, and two prisoners was extracted on a UH1B. A Marine H-34 attempted to pick up the remaining team members but was too large for the LZ. They lowered a hoist and secured one LLDB but were unable to stay on station because of equipment problems. The remaining U.S advisor and one LLDB were extracted the following morning.
Team 7 was compromised by an estimated two squads of VC on April 20th. They were extracted as they called an airstrike on the enemy position.28
Essentially all of the teams from that point forward attempted insertions and aborted multiple times before being successful. Once on the ground they invariably made contact with the enemy or were compromised and forced to be exfiltrated early. There were a total of six Roadrunner missions planned but only two occurred. On April 22nd the Roadrunners refused to participate in further missions. They were disarmed and transported back to Nha Trang to be inducted into the regular ARVN.
The last recon mission on this operation was conducted by Team 10 with LTC Warren tagging along as an observer. Jack Warren had a reputation of being a good guy, close to his troops, and known to carouse with them on occasion. He approached Roland Marquis about accompanying his team into the hole and was politely rebuffed. He quickly approached Team 10, whose members’ names have been lost in history, and was accepted as a straphanger third American. The team prepared for infiltration and headed for their LZ atop a hill a
t last light. The team exited one side of the helicopter and Warren exited the other. Once assembled on the ground the team leader noticed that Warren was missing and assumed that he had simply changed his mind and stayed on the helicopter. Two days later two Montagnards suspected of being VC were detained by the team, along with their families.28 As the team prepared for extraction the S-3 officer at the FOB, CPT Walters, asked to speak with LTC Warren, call sign Buzzard 6. The team, after a lengthy pause, reported that Buzzard 6 was not with them and had not been with them for the entire mission. Panic ensued at the FOB. The Commanding Officer of a classified intelligence gathering organization was missing in hostile country. Warren’s loss would have huge recriminations in the war effort. A search was immediately launched in conjunction with Team 10’s recovery and Warren was found signaling with his fluorescent panel and mirror close to where he had departed from the helicopter. None the worse for wear, he had holed up without a radio assuming that sooner or later someone would miss him. He definitely needed a drink back at the FOB.92
Between May 5th and May 12th, 1966 Project Delta was requested to perform flank surveillance for the 1st U.S. Infantry Division during an operation they were conducting near Tay Ninh. A total of six recon teams were inserted. Teams 2 and 11 were extracted after making contact with the enemy. Team 7 was compromised by an estimated VC battalion. Under heavy enemy fire the U.S advisors, Norm Doney and Charlie Telfair, directed a 44 sortie airstrike, killing an estimated 150 enemy.29,30 These impressive results served to further gain the attention of the higher echelons of command in Vietnam.