Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta Page 12

  When General Westmoreland recognized the unique capabilities of Project Delta he was given a briefing at the Delta compound in Nha Trang and provided with a close look at the gear carried into the field by a recon man. Joe Alderman was selected to demonstrate for the General.

  Project Delta’s next assignment was scheduled to be a two phase mission in support of the 25th Infantry Division. The FOB was set up at Fire Base Oasis in II Corps. Mission Support Sites (MSSs) were established at Pleiku and Plei Me. The 281st Assault Helicopter Company (AHC) absorbed the 2nd Platoon, 171st Aviation Company and was operationally attached to Project Delta. Quartered in the 5th Special Forces Group compound in Nha Trang, the 281st would continue to provide primary support to Project Delta and the soon-to-be formed Recondo School. During this operation another twist was added. Three mixed U.S./VN teams were attached Operational Contingent (OPCON) to Project Delta from Team C-5, the Special Forces C-Team designated for special operations. During this operation Project Delta recon teams conducted 19 missions, Delta Roadrunners conducted 3 missions, and the C-5 teams conducted 3 missions. The Rangers were deployed as camp security but did not participate in field operations. The areas of operation were on fairly flat and open ground which allowed rapid movement through the reconnaissance zones. Three battalions of enemy troops were observed as they moved freely into Cambodia. Contact was limited to just a few firefights. One prisoner was captured as he was moving toward Cambodia and his interrogation yielded valuable information about the presence and identification of units in and around the border areas.

  Observations indicated that the enemy were well dressed, well armed, and well organized. A way station was found that showed signs of recent use. The prisoner revealed that he was traveling from one way station, probably the one found by the recon team, to another in Cambodia, indicating that travel routes were well used and well known. It was estimated that a large NVA force was staged in Cambodia and was capable of infiltrating across the entire area in a period of a day or less.31 Phase II of this operation was cancelled.

  Project Delta was called to Dong Tre in support of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Operation Nathan Hale. The original request called for six recon teams to be inserted in support of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division but was quickly changed to request an additional four teams to support the 1st Brigade. One company from Delta’s 91st Airborne Rangers was tasked with FOB security and immediate action responsibility with no field operations planned.

  Upon arrival at the FOB the Project Delta Commander, LTC Jack Warren, and his staff flew an overview of the AO in preparation for the operation. The C&C ship was accompanied by two gunships from the 281st AHC Wolfpack. One of the gunships spotted a lone man standing in a field waving at the helicopters. The gunship flew a quick flight around the man and ascertained that he was alone and unarmed. A slick with the command team aboard swooped in and someone jumped out and gathered the man and put him aboard. He had a .50 caliber ammo box with him that contained two old PRC 6 radio batteries and a pressure bandage. His pockets were stuffed with Chieu Hoi (open arms) leaflets that he immediately began to hand out to LTC Warren and each of the other crew members and occupants. After returning to the FOB, the captive VC explained that his area had been recently subjected to operations conducted by both the 1st Cavalry Division and the 101st Airborne Division. He had sustained multiple fragmentation wounds from the persistent bombing and had had enough.

  Project Delta again demonstrated its flexibility in responding to requests for insertion of the Rangers on short notice to conduct a combat assault on troop concentrations identified by recon elements. One of Project Delta’s recon teams identified a large enemy presence and called for elements of the 1st Cavalry to conduct a combat operation. Quick response by that unit resulted in the enemy force breaking up into small groups and scattering into hiding rather than engaging the U.S. forces. An unarmed prisoner was captured by a 281st AHC crew and questioned. He identified a number of NVA and VC units operating in the area and revealed that their standing orders were to avoid contact and to break into smaller groups to evade the U.S forces. He further indicated that the goal of the local units was to wait until the conventional units departed to launch an attack on the Dong Tre Special Forces CIDG camp.32 Operation 8-66 in support of Operation Nathan Hale lasted one week, from June 25th through July 2nd, 1966.

  CHAPTER IX: COUNTERINSURGENCY

  The fourth named campaign of the Vietnam War was “Counteroffensive, Phase II”, 1 July 1966 - 31 May 1967. United States operations after 1 July 1966 were a continuation of the earlier counteroffensive campaign. Recognizing the interdependence of political, economic, sociological, and military factors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that American military objectives should be to cause North Vietnam to cease its control and support of the insurgency in South Vietnam and Laos, to assist South Vietnam in defeating Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, and to assist South Vietnam in pacification extending governmental control over its territory.

  North Vietnam continued to build its own forces inside South Vietnam. At first this was done by continued infiltration by sea and along the Ho Chi Minh trail and then, in early 1966, through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). U.S. air elements received permission to conduct reconnaissance bombing raids, and tactical air strikes into North Vietnam just north of the DMZ, but ground forces were denied authority to conduct reconnaissance patrols in the northern portion of the DMZ and inside North Vietnam. Confined to South Vietnamese territory U.S. ground forces fought a war of attrition against the enemy, relying for a time on body counts as one standard indicator for measuring successful progress for winning the war.

  During 1966 there were eighteen major operations, the most successful of these being Operation WHITE WING (MASHER). During this operation, the 1st Cavalry Division, Korean units, and ARVN forces cleared the northern half of Binh Dinh Province on the central coast. In the process they decimated a division, later designated the North Vietnamese 3d Division. The U.S. 3d Marine Division was moved into the area of the two northern provinces and in concert with South Vietnamese Army and other Marine Corps units, conducted Operation HASTINGS against enemy infiltrators across the DMZ.

  The largest sweep of 1966 took place northwest of Saigon in Operation ATTLE-BORO, involving 22,000 American and South Vietnamese troops pitted against the VC 9th Division and a NVA regiment. The Allies defeated the enemy and, in what became a frequent occurrence, forced him back to his havens in Cambodia or Laos.

  By 31 December 1966, U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam numbered 385,300. Enemy forces also increased substantially, so that for the same period, total enemy strength was in excess of 282,000 in addition to an estimated 80,000 political cadres. By 30 June 1967, total U.S. forces in SVN had risen to 448,800, but enemy strength had increased as well.

  On 8 January U.S. and South Vietnamese troops launched separate drives against two major VC strongholds in South Vietnam in the so-called “Iron Triangle” about 25 miles northwest of Saigon. For years this area had been under development as a VC logistics base and headquarters to control enemy activity in and around Saigon. The Allies captured huge caches of rice and other foodstuffs, destroyed a mammoth system of tunnels, and seized documents of considerable intelligence value.

  In February, the same U.S. forces that had cleared the “Iron Triangle”, were committed with other units in the largest allied operation of the war to date, JUNCTION CITY. Over 22 U.S. and four ARVN battalions engaged the enemy, killing 2,728. After clearing this area, the Allies constructed three airfields; erected a bridge and fortified two camps in which CIDG garrisons remained as the other allied forces withdrew.65

  Two weeks after leaving Dong Tre Project Delta was requested to again support the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), this time from an FOB at Buon Blech in II Corps. A total of ten recon teams and two Roadrunner teams were deployed. Recon Team 8 encountered a squad of eight enemy and initiated contact, ki
lling three. Roadrunner Team 102 was fired upon by a single enemy soldier and successfully evaded and continued the mission. Except for these two contacts no enemy were detected in the area of operation that stretched along the Cambodian border. Heavy rains had flooded the streams and erased any recent signs of travel. This short operation began on July 15th and ended on July 29th. Major Luttrell assumed command of Project Delta during this operation.33

  Operation 10-66 was conducted in two phases between August 9th and September 5th, 1966. The first phase was conducted from an FOB at Song Be and Delta was placed OPCON to the Vietnamese III Corps. The second phase was conducted from an FOB established at Tay Ninh on August 23rd where Delta operated OPCON to the U.S. II Field Force Vietnam (FFV), and in cooperation with the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Brigade, 196th Light Infantry Brigade. Ten Delta Recon Teams, Five Roadrunner Teams and two Ranger operations were conducted from FOB Song Be. The missions started off quietly enough with only minimal enemy sightings in the first two days. On the third day, August 13th, Team 11 called in an air strike on two buildings and seven enemy, destroying both buildings and killing five enemy. On the 14th the 2nd Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion (U.S. advisors: LT Deaton, LT Hamilton, SFC Winder, SSG Musselwhite, SSG Raines) conducted a sweep of the village of Phuc Hanh. The Rangers encountered an estimated company of NVA deployed as a delaying force to cover the retreat of a larger force. The Rangers suffered two killed and eight wounded but succeeded in driving the enemy off with air support. The houses in the village each had a bunker beneath it. The rapid deployment of the enemy force led U.S. advisors to believe that the enemy had advance knowledge of the Ranger sweep. This was confirmed when three refugees, discovered hiding in a tunnel in the village, revealed that they had been warned by the NVA the night before to leave because a force of 100 VN and Americans was coming to the village. (Author’s note: In researching this operation I came across one of the more humorous transposition errors in the 10-66 AAR. When referring to this suspicion the author, or typist, under “Conclusions and Recommendations” documents the following: “Recommend that planning of future operations be conducted with minimum U.S. and VC personnel.”34 The Rangers continued onward to perform a Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA). Next to one bomb crater the Rangers found two dead NVA, a severed human arm and several weapons.34 On August 17th Team 7, led by Norm Doney, called in air strikes on an estimated 150 enemy resulting in an estimated 95 killed. Doney returned to the area after the team was extracted to assist the FAC (LT John Flanagan) in directing more strikes. It was estimated that this mission destroyed an NVA regiment.36 Norm Doney was awarded the Silver Star for his actions that day. Team 3 observed an estimated 250 NVA in khaki uniforms on August 20th and called in air strikes on their position. On the last mission from Song Be Team 9 requested helicopter gunships to fire upon two enemy platoons and cover their extraction under fire. The first rescue ship into the LZ was shot down by enemy automatic weapons fire. The crew was gathered up by the team and secured in the midst of a 35 minute firefight until two additional rescue ships effected the extraction.34 On August 23rd the FOB at Song Be closed out and Delta relocated to the FOB at Tay Ninh.

  The first team inserted from Tay Ninh was Team 2, advised by SGT Eugene Moreau and SGT Johnny Varner, on August 25th, 1966. On the 26th Team 2 requested an air strike on an unknown number of enemy. The team had observed many enemy moving in small groups of two or three. Ten 500 pound bombs were dropped, five of which were duds. Unfortunately, this would serve as a prelude to disaster. On August 27th the Army radio relay aircraft attempted to contact Team 2 for a routine situation report without success. Team 2 had been attacked from the rear by a platoon sized force. The team was split during the firefight with both advisors and two LLDB forced into a small clearing. The enemy opened fire and hit both Americans and one LLDB. The enemy continued to fire from the tree line but did not attempt to overrun the disabled team. The Forward Air Controller (FAC) flew over the area with the Project Delta commanding officer and spotted a red signal panel and red smoke on the ground. They also saw a flashing signal mirror some 700 meters from the smoke and panel. The FAC flew over the smoke at tree top level and reported seeing one man lying face down and one man lying face up in a small clearing. He immediately called for a rescue ship. The rescue ship arrived on location with SGT Tim O’Connor, Delta medic, on board. O’Connor carried SGT Varner to the helicopter and placed him inside. SGT Varner was wounded in the chest and thigh. SGT O’ Connor returned to try and retrieve SGT Moreau but came under enemy fire and was wounded in the leg. He was forced to return to the helicopter without the body of SGT Moreau, who had died of his wounds. One LLDB emerged from the tree line and entered the helicopter. Another was discovered some distance from the casualties and lifted by McGuire rig. The 4th Ranger Company (U.S. advisors: LT Deaton, LT Hamilton, SSG Munoz, SSG Raines) was alerted and transported to the AO within two hours. They secured the body of SGT Moreau and that of LLDB CPL Mo and set up a perimeter for the night. On August 28th the bodies of SGT Moreau and CPL Mo were retrieved and the 4th Company was returned to FOB. While the recovery mission was being conducted the FAC, Lt Skinner Simpson, was flying around the AO with a Tom Carpenter in the back seat. They spotted ten to fifteen enemy soldiers and immediately dived on them to an altitude of 100 feet. Carpenter opened fire with an M-79 grenade launcher and killed three enemy.34 Upon returning to the FOB the Air Force ALO, Airman Rudy Bishop, painted three stick figures on the fuselage of the O2 Bird Dog, reminiscent of the WWI aces.

  Team 5 encountered a lone enemy soldier who was quickly killed. Among the items recovered from the soldier were a message control book and two encoded messages. Nearly all of the teams committed from Tay Ninh encountered and engaged the enemy. Team 6, Leo Kelland and Burhl Cunningham, was pursued by the enemy from the time of insertion and attempted to evade for two days before they were able to observe a road and trail intersection. They observed a platoon sized element travel down the road and take a break at the intersection with the trail. Soon another platoon came down the trail and joined the first platoon. Soon after that a third platoon came down the road and joined the first two. The group was commanded by a female VC. Kelland called for an air strike on the group and advised the FAC that they would have to be extracted immediately because the enemy force would likely scatter in their direction and they would be in an untenable situation. The FAC advised them that there was a small LZ some 75 meters to their rear. Kelland instructed the FAC to have the jets prep the LZ with napalm simultaneously with the bombing runs to clear the tall grass and allow the helicopters to set down for a swift extraction. The plan was executed and the team ran for the LZ. As they approached the helicopters the 281st door gunner and the Delta recon man riding recovery opened fire over their heads and killed several VC who had shed their equipment and were sprinting after the team in an effort to capture them. Leo Kelland, known as a fit soldier and a fierce warrior, would comment that he could hardly imagine what the outcome would be if one of those wiry little guys managed to tackle one of our guys burdened with web gear and rucksack and exhausted from days on patrol.92

  One Roadrunner team encountered an enemy company and requested an air strike as they ran for an LZ. On the way to the LZ they observed a bunker equipped with typewriters, stacks of documents, khaki uniforms, and occupied by one soldier. They destroyed the bunker with hand grenades and made their way to an LZ.

  The last team extracted was Team 12, Tom Carpenter and Mike Stanfield, which was surrounded by enemy troops and could not proceed. SFC Charles Harper was wounded in the chest and leg during this engagement and medevaced to Cu Chi.34,92 The FOB at Tay Ninh was closed out on September 5th, 1966 and the Project returned to Nha Trang.

  The name of Eugene Moreau is inscribed on Panel 10E, Line 50 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  Operation 11-66 was a one day operation conducted from Cam Ranh Bay. One team of seven U.S. advisors and two LLDB was inserted to look for
the wreckage of a F-4C aircraft belonging to the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing. The team searched the area without finding any sign of either the wreckage or any Air Force survivors.35

  On September 25th, 1966 Project Delta returned to Tay Ninh and was placed under OPCON to the Commanding General, III Corps. Between September 25th and October 4th four recon missions, two Roadrunner missions and six Ranger operations were conducted. These operations were conducted in cooperation with the CIDG force located at Trai Bi Special Forces Camp. Two companies of the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion staged at Trai Bi and conducted operations from there. Four Roadrunner teams co-located with the Rangers in preparation for stay behind missions where they would accompany the Rangers on an operation and then separate to conduct their own reconnaissance.37 The Recon men of Project Delta were confused by the mission. They had successfully located large enemy concentrations in this area only a month before and were being asked to go back and verify their findings. Given the numerous enemy contacts from previous missions, and the loss of SGT Moreau, they could not be blamed for being affronted at being second guessed. True professionals, they accepted the missions and went again.36

  Recon Teams 3 and 9 were inserted at last light on September 26th. On the 27th Team 9, Joel Schenkelberger, another American, and Australian SAS team member Jewell, discovered a battalion base camp. The troops were assembled in bleachers and were being instructed by an NVA NCO, who was demonstrating the nomenclature and assembly of the AK 47. Schenk quietly whispered the team’s findings to the FAC and requested an air strike. An excited C&C ship persistently broke into the radio communication and repeatedly asked, “What are they doing now?” Schenk calmly directed the air strike and observed the damage before running toward an LZ. Again the C&C ship interrupted with, “What are they doing now?” In a deadpan voice Schenk calmly replied, “Now they’re conducting first aid class.” LT Flanagan, the FAC, reported large secondary explosions and fires after the attack.36,92