Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta Page 7

  As the McGuire Rig evolved with improvements, so did the rope ladders. Norm Doney had observed rope ladders constructed of wire rope and aluminum steps being used by conventional units elsewhere in Vietnam. He sent Gary Nichols to “obtain” some for use in the Project. They proved to be much easier to climb, less prone to tangles and sturdier in construction than the older rope ladders. In order to have all of the options available to any team from a single aircraft, the bulkiness of the ladders needed to be taken into consideration when rigging the rescue ships. The 80 foot ladders were arranged so that 35 feet could be deployed from each door, allowing for faster deployment and extraction of team members.30

  After the McGuire rigs had been installed in the floor of the helicopter, the 80-foot aluminum and steel cable ladder was installed on top of them, with 35 feet of the ladder rolled up and secured between the skid and the troop deck on each side of the helicopter. The center of the ladder was snap linked to anchor rings in the helicopter’s floor, and the ladder rolls were attached to floor anchor rings with standard aircraft seatbelts. To release the ladders, the seatbelt releases were “kicked” open, and of course, the order to release the ladders was “Kick the Ladders.” After the ladders had been lowered, they could be pulled back up to the helicopter by a rope that ran the entire length of the ladder.91

  When the decision was made to employ the McGuire rigs, the rolled up ladder on the left side of the helicopter was pulled inside and stowed on the right side. To protect the ropes from the sharp outer edge of the helicopter floor, the Recovery NCO would unfold the Griswold containers and slide the outer end of the containers over this area, making sure that the thick canvas fabric of the container was between the ropes and the floor edge.91

  As soon as the helicopter had descended to less than 100 feet above the Recon team, the Recovery NCO would pick up each sandbag and toss them out and over the skid. The weight of the sandbag pulled the McGuire rig and rope out of the Griswold container and down to the ground below at a high rate of speed. It was up to the Recon team to dodge the sandbags.91

  On July 5th, 1965, Project Delta received a warning order for an operation to be conducted from Pleiku, in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. The operation was in support of a major initiative by the 173rd Airborne Brigade to clear Highway 19 of insurgents. The major offensive was scheduled to begin on July 16th. Project Delta was to insert two teams on July 11th and to insert three more teams and a company of Rangers beginning July 16th. The recon teams were operating at a team strength of two U.S. advisors and eight LLDB. The mission was to locate enemy units responsible for disruption of traffic on Highway 19. One aspect of each team’s mission was to locate and document Landing Zones (LZ) sufficient to accommodate landing a Ranger Company as a reaction force in the event of discovery of enemy units. These missions were planned for a duration of nine days. Teams 2 and 5 were inserted last light on July 11th.

  Team 5 observed enemy movements of squad and platoon size on each of the first two days. On the 13th a smaller element consisting of one U.S. advisor and two LLDB separated from the team and searched for huts that had been spotted from the air. They became disoriented in the thick vegetation and were forced to remain overnight (RON) at some distance from the rest of the team. They had their location fixed by aircraft the next day and rejoined the team late on the 14th. On the 15th the team was instructed to abandon its recon mission and move speedily to a location some 10 kilometers away to secure an LZ for the Rangers. The team sped recklessly along trails and open areas to try and meet the time deadline set by headquarters. Five hours past their deadline they were still 1,500 meters short of their target. They contacted headquarters and were instructed to change direction and find an LZ for extraction. This was accomplished on the 16th.16

  Team 2 infiltrated without incident and stopped for the night a short distance from their insertion point. On the 12th the team had two separate encounters with local forces. The first was with two women who fled shouting and the second was with three armed VC. No gunfire was exchanged and the team moved to an overnight location. On the 13th the team reported escaping an ambush and encountered increasing evidence of the presence of a large enemy force. The team prepared to send out a smaller three man recon group to investigate a series of newly thatched huts. As the team prepared to split they were attacked by an estimated company sized force. During the initial barrage, MSG Henry J. Gallant was wounded in the stomach and was last seen being assisted in a run for cover by SSG Fred Taylor. The team returned fire and fled in different directions. Team member SGT Bang was wounded in the chest and fled with another LLDB team member, LT Cuong, and the LLDB team leader. They hid in the jungle and were joined by another team member, Cpl. Hung, at about midnight. On the 14th the four were surrounded by an unknown number of enemy while trying to make radio contact. In the ensuing firefight the group became separated again. After 40 minutes the team leader again joined with SGT Bang, who had sustained a wound to the head, and Cpl. Hung. LT Cuong was killed in the exchange of fire. Meanwhile radio contact was established with two additional LLDB team members, each in different locations. The separated team members remained hidden through the remainder of the 14th and all of the 15th. On July 16th the group of three survivors and one additional individual team member were extracted. The final team member was located and picked up on July 17th. Major Strange requested additional forces from II Corps to assist in the search. Three CIDG Companies performed a search in the vicinity of the Escape and Evasion (E&E) route preplanned by the team. Additional forces were requested to search the area in which the team was operating but the Airborne Brigade would not allow commitment of those troops into its area of operation. Airborne searches were made on successive days through the 23rd to no avail. One half of Team 2, two U.S. advisors and three LLDB, was gone.16

  The three remaining teams were infiltrated on the 16th and 17th and remained on the ground for periods ranging from five to ten days. Enemy contact was made but no casualties were sustained. The first planned deployment of any element of the Ranger Battalion as other than a reaction force took place on this operation. The 1st Airborne Ranger Company of the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion was deployed on a ten day mission to screen potential enemy travel routes. The Company was advised by Cpt. Tom Pusser and three enlisted U.S. personnel. The 1st Company successfully completed its mission and identified the main travel routes as directed. In his after action report Captain Pusser demonstrated his critical leadership skills in identifying strengths and weaknesses and making recommendations for corrections.16

  Major Strange hailed the operation a success. Project Delta had worked a major initiative with a conventional unit and completed its assigned tasks. Of major concern to Strange was the fact that the experienced pilots had been transferred from Delta prior to this operation in order to support the growing MACV Studies and Observation Group (SOG). The less experienced pilots assigned in their place proved to be prone to navigational errors.16

  On July 19th, 1965, a Board of Inquiry was held to determine the status of MSG Henry Gallant and SSG Fred Taylor. After reviewing the eyewitness accounts and other evidence the Board determined that both men should continue to be carried as Missing in Action (MIA). One year later a second Board convened and determined that, in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary, the status of both men would be changed to Killed in Action (KIA) Body Not Recovered (BNR).

  Master Sergeant Henry Gallant’s name is inscribed on Panel 02E, Line

  36 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial. Staff Sergeant Fred Taylor’s name is inscribed on Panel 02E, Line

  37 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  Project Delta returned to Nha Trang to regroup. The LLDB retreated to their homes and to the Tent City in the Delta compound. Many of the U.S. advisors took comfort at the Jockey Club, their beachfront villa. This is where their new commander, Major Charlie Beckwith, found them on a quiet Monday morning. “Chargin’ Charlie” had been diverted from a no
n-Special Forces advisory billet to the 5th Group by its Commanding Officer, Col. Bill McKean. McKean assigned Beckwith to Project Delta with the admonishment that he hoped the Project would do better.1 Major Beckwith demanded that the thirty members of the Project be assembled back at the Delta compound to stand in formation while he addressed them. Beckwith has been described in a number of ways but the consensus is that you either loved the guy or you hated him. A lot of that had to do with his aggressive nature in attacking situations, a style that some considered reckless and self serving. When he confronted the troops at the Jockey Club he received a response that suggested a conciliatory meeting be held at the Club accompanied by a few beers and some female companionship. Beckwith pulled no punches and had his men standing in formation at the Delta Compound in short order. There he read them the riot act and declared the Jockey Club off limits to all Delta personnel. He further told them that they were there to kill the enemy, not to make money, and anyone who could not embrace that philosophy had better leave. All but seven left. Beckwith’s Executive Officer (XO), Major Thompson, retrieved a few of the men he considered salvageable. Left extremely shorthanded Major Beckwith considered the squalid and muddy conditions that led the men to seek alternative housing and he approached Col. McKean with a proposition. He would be allowed to build a better compound and staff it with personnel he personally selected. In return he promised to rebuild an elite covert reconnaissance unit. McKean quickly agreed. “Chargin’ Charlie” sat down that night and drafted a call for volunteers that went to virtually all of the Special Forces camps in Vietnam. It read, “WANTED: Volunteers for Project Delta. Will guarantee you a medal, a body bag, or both.”1 The response was tremendous.

  Beckwith set criteria for screening that included requirements for at least six months in Vietnam, the individual must already have earned a Combat Infantryman’s Badge (CIB), he had to have attained the rank of at least Sergeant E-5, and he had to be a volunteer. The ranks quickly filled and a series of operations soon followed.1 While the operational teams were being built the new Delta compound came under construction across the road from the Tent City. Construction was supervised by SFC Gerald Parmentier who had already built several A-Camps.7

  On August 9th, 1965, Project Delta received a warning order for a limited recon operation to be run out of Pleiku. Three teams were inserted on August 11th and two more were inserted on August 13th. No significant intelligence came from this operation except that several company sized units were observed at different times that were dressed in khaki uniforms. Most observations pointed to recent movement of larger forces through the area.17 One significant aspect of the operation was that Team 6 was lead by Major Beckwith and SFC Norbert Weber. Beckwith figured that the best way to learn his new business was to experience it firsthand. His trip into the “hole” proved to him the tremendous amount of vigilance and skill required of the men on the ground. He experienced the frustration of poor communication, less than ideal operating conditions, and the frustration of dealing with air assets that belonged to another unit. He gained a real appreciation for the self reliance necessary for survival. His mission was what the experienced men termed a “dry hole”, meaning no enemy contact was made, and it only lasted two nights. In his typical critical style, Beckwith recommended that more autonomy be granted the Project. He made a strong case for better advance planning that would include input from Delta before it was committed. He also demanded authority to control the Airborne Ranger assets without concurrence from any other command. Beckwith went on to point out that the recent loss of experienced Vietnamese pilots to other commands was leading to mistakes in execution of missions.1,17

  On October 9th,1965, Project Delta was deployed to Phu Cat located in the coastal area near Qui Nhon, north of Nha Trang. The operation was to be a small one consisting of five recon teams. The mission was severely hampered by heavy rain and low clouds. SSG Donald Hannah was slightly wounded by friendly helicopter fire on one mission. All the teams were collected before the scheduled end of the operation in order to support an emergent situation at the Plei Me CIDG camp in the central highlands.18 The CIDG camp at Plei Me was located on National Route 6C approximately 25 miles southwest of Pleiku. It was manned by about 400 Montagnards and their families and advised by a Special Forces A-Team of 12 U.S. advisors and their LLDB counterparts. On the evening of October 19th, 1965, an estimated three regiments of hardcore VC surrounded the camp. They entrenched themselves in a manner that suggested that they intended to fight it out with whatever the Plei Me forces could throw at them. This represented a significant departure from the typical small force hit and run tactics experienced to date. The attack, in fact, was the spear head of a major effort by North Vietnam to divide the South in half using the conventional North Vietnamese Army (NVA).1

  Coincidental with October 20th order to mobilize to Pleiku, Major Beckwith finally got his authorization to commit two Airborne Ranger Companies without concurrence from any other command. Although still under the command of the LLDB, they were now considered a wholly owned asset of the Project. Beckwith asked for volunteers from his command that were not committed on the Phu Cat operation. He gathered fifteen men and the two Airborne Ranger Companies and shuttled to Qui Nhon. At Qui Nhon there ensued a discussion of how best to utilize the Delta force. Various plans were considered including a parachute assault. It was finally decided that an airmobile operation using the helicopter assets of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to an infiltration point approximately 7 kilometers from the besieged camp was the best option. Another discussion took place wherein the 1st Cavalry was forced to rearrange its priorities in order to support the operation. The LZ was prepped by airstrikes and the assault by the two Ranger companies and fifteen Delta volunteers took place on October 21st. The LLDB commander, Major Tat, agreed with Major Beckwith that the movement should be slow and cautious. Four hours into the march the lead element surprised and killed three enemy troops. Two were armed and the other carried 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition. The LLDB searched the enemy for documents and learned that they were not hardcore VC, but were NVA regulars. This information made the Rangers very nervous and Major Tat informed Beckwith that he was taking the two companies and turning back. Beckwith told him to do whatever he wanted, but his mission was to relieve the camp and he would do it with or without the Rangers. A few hours later, Tat and the Rangers returned saying that they would lose face if they didn’t continue. Early on the morning of the 22nd, Project Delta’s force made a 400 meter dash down the entrance road to the camp. One LLDB lieutenant was killed, two U.S. advisors were wounded, and one American civilian photographer was killed. Major Beckwith assumed command of Plei Me. Later that same day, both Ranger Companies conducted sweeping assaults outside the gates to try and clear the area of the heaviest concentrations of fire. Captain Thomas W. Pusser chose to accompany what he considered to be the weaker of the two companies, reasoning that he could be a positive leadership influence in case they should falter. This company attacked the northern slope from which sustained heavy enemy fire had rained down on the camp. When the company came under heavy machine gun fire the Rangers became confused and disoriented. In an attempt to assist the Company Commander in bringing order to the situation Captain Pusser directed the movement of several wounded to the rear and assumed a lead position in assaulting the machine gun. Captain Pusser was fatally wounded 25 meters in front of the gun position. The Rangers regrouped inside the compound.

  During the next 48 hours the NVA bombarded the camp relentlessly with recoilless rifle and mortar attacks. The camp had become a hideous stockpile of killed and wounded, both friendly and enemy. The stench of death was overpowering and Beckwith sought to bring some semblance of order to the camp. He called for evacuation of the dead and wounded and could get no volunteers from the 1st Cavalry to fly into the camp. Finally, on the third day, LT Khoi, a Vietnamese pilot assigned to Delta, made two flights into Plei Me in his H-34 and left with full loads of dead a
nd wounded. On one of his runs he was accompanied by a young medic, SSG Jimmie McBynum, from the C-Team, who had volunteered to come in and help. SSG McBynum was struck by enemy fire and killed before he could exit the helicopter. On October 23rd and 24th over 100 sorties were flown in support of the camp. Major Thompson, the departing Delta XO, directed continuous air strikes around the clock. High explosive ordnance, cluster bombs and napalm turned the landscape into a smoldering black moonscape. The NVA departed.

  On October 25th, armored reinforcements arrived at the camp and set up defensive positions outside the perimeter. Major Beckwith assembled a team to recover the bodies of Captain Pusser and the other Rangers killed in the assault on the 22nd. To show his great respect and gratitude to Captain Pusser, the Ranger Commander, Major Tat, said no, he would recover the bodies. Captain Pusser had been one of them that day. War and the jungle elements are not kind to the remains of soldiers, making recovery of remains a gruesome task. Captain Pusser’s body was recovered by Major Tat, identified, and prepared for the long journey home.1,19

  On October 25th, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) arrived at Plei Me to assume the recovery operation. Major Beckwith directed them to an area of concentration of enemy bodies. It was estimated that nearly 1,000 enemy lay dead outside the camp. Some were found chained to their machine guns. Bulldozers were eventually brought in to cover everything over.1