Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta Page 3

  The Forward Operations Base (FOB) was located at or near an air strip capable of landing aircraft from small O-2 Bird Dogs to C-130 cargo planes. It was preferable to have the supporting helicopter unit adjacent to the FOB for practical purposes. The FOB was established by a few advance party Delta men with the assistance of some Rangers for security and some local laborers to fill sand bags. Perimeters were established with stacked rolls of concertina wire and fortified defensive firing positions. Once the local laborers were gone claymore mines and noise makers would be placed with trip wires outside the wire. This was to prevent the locals from mapping the defenses. General Purpose (GP) medium tents were erected to house the Delta personnel, the communications equipment, medical facility, the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), mess facilities and, of course, the beer tent. Generators supplied electricity and water had to be found locally. The tents were fortified with sandbags and fighting trenches were dug for personnel to man when the FOB came under attack. A mortar pit was dug close to the recon quarters. Usually a horseshoe pit and volleyball net were set up. The men slept on army cots and might have a sleeping bag or a poncho liner for cover. Mosquito netting was sometimes available to be erected like a miniature tent around a cot. Each man kept his weapons and web gear at the ready beside his bed. At many FOBs the crews of the C-130s would allow Delta guys to pilfer the aluminum cargo pallets from the aircraft to be used to place the cots on. This kept the cots out of the mud and the gear drier. It also had the unfortunate consequence of providing shelter for venomous snakes and insects during the rainy season.

  Once the Project leadership had flown their aerial reconnaissance of the entire AO they would formulate a plan with the unit to which it was OPCON. Since the areas that Delta was requested to work in were quite large, it was sound practice to divide them into zones so that each zone would be worked in some order. This allowed the teams to be working in closer proximity to each other so that air support wouldn’t be compromised if more than one team was in trouble at the same time. It also allowed much easier radio communication for the FACs if teams weren’t separated by land features that restricted line of sight communication. Delta recon teams normally operated very close to the flight time limitations of the helicopters used for insertions and extractions. It was normal for a team to be inserted forty or fifty miles from the nearest support facility or the FOB. Time on station for helicopters might be only fifteen minutes or so. After reviewing the plan the operations and intelligence staff formulated briefings for each area to be assigned to a recon team, a Ranger company or the BDA platoon. The briefing was presented to the recon team leaders, both U.S. and his VN counterpart, the FAC and the helicopter flight crew in the form of a warning order. Armed with the limited information about suspected enemy activity in his reconnaissance zone, the team leader would arrange an aerial reconnaissance, usually with the FAC pilot. The aerial reconnaissance was conducted from an altitude high enough not to alert the enemy but low enough to give the team leader an opportunity to select suitable LZs, register significant land features, map a mission route and plan for emergency contingencies such as rally points and escape and evasion (E&E) routes. While the team leader flew his aerial mission the remainder of the team members were alerted to an imminent mission and began preparing their gear, cleaning and test firing their weapons and practicing immediate action drills.

  The team leaders formulated a detailed plan that met the requirements for performing the assigned mission, whether it was for area reconnaissance, prisoner snatch, wire tap or other interdiction. The team leaders would conduct a mission brief-back with all members of the team, the helicopter pilots, the FAC and the Project leadership in attendance. The mission briefings were held in the Tactical Operations Center and attendance was strictly limited in the interest of security. The briefings were very detailed and were conducted in both English and Vietnamese. The team’s plan was scrutinized by everyone in attendance and refined as necessary to a finished product. The time from issuance of the warning order until insertion of a team varied from a few hours to forty eight hours, many times depending on the weather. When the 281st AHC was attached for mission support, the helicopter crew that inserted the team was also responsible for extracting them. The time between the final brief back and insertion was spent preparing equipment, checking communications, mentally rehearsing aspects of the mission, practicing maneuvers such as stream or trail crossing, prisoner snatches, quick reaction to enemy ambush from different directions, night positions and small things like being able to locate and extract any single item from a rucksack without taking it off. Beards were allowed to grow to reduce the shine from bare skin, dog tags, jewelry and personal items were stowed in a safe place. Camouflage paint was applied to all exposed skin and carried in a shirt pocket for easy re-application in the field. Departure time, either at first or last light, came quickly.

  Teams that were departing for a mission were invariably accompanied to the helicopters by the Recon NCOIC, many other recon men and even the detachment commander. These men, often rowdy in their displays of bravado in rear areas, were typically quiet and all business when seeing a team off, offering firm handshakes, words of caution and encouragement and a steady gaze into their eyes that said simply, “You are my brother. Come back.”

  CHAPTER II: THE U.S. SITUATION

  The Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 established the 17th parallel as the dividing line between North and South Vietnam. The accords also called for the North to cease all aggression and allow the South to effectively “sort out” its destiny free and secure from outside aggression and threats. In 1960 the Viet Cong (VC) stepped up its effort to destroy orderly government in South Vietnam through acts of terrorism. They routinely attacked the fragile infrastructure of local governments by killing and beating village leaders, clergy and the educated. They accomplished much of their reign of terror by utilizing old weapons buried from the French Indochina War period and from makeshift weapons crudely fashioned in their own shops. After the United States became involved in 1961 at the request of the South Vietnamese government, there was a noticeable increase in the numbers and quality of weapons used by the VC.3 The organization of the VC changed tremendously under the direction of military cadre infiltrated from the North. The transformation from loosely connected regional and district guerrilla bands to a coordinated paramilitary force boasting regimental sized headquarters was accomplished over a five year period under the nose of the Vietnamese government and largely through routes established in then neutral Laos.4 Between 1961 and 1965 the estimated VC strength rose from 2 regimental headquarters to 5, from 25 battalions to 50 battalions, and from 20,000 regular hardcore VC to around 32,000. It is estimated that there were another 60,000 to 80,000 “part time” VC.3 Increasing numbers of weapons appeared in 1964 that were of modern vintage from Communist China and other Communist Bloc countries. The ammunition for these weapons was 7.62 mm, not available in South Vietnam, thus making the VC even more dependent on the North. 3

  The first named campaign of the Vietnam War was “Advisory”, 15 March 1962 - 7 March 1965. During this period, direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict increased steadily as U.S. trained Vietnamese pilots moved Vietnamese helicopter units into and out of combat. Ultimately the United States hoped that a strong Vietnamese government would result in improved internal security and national defense. The number of U.S. advisors in the field rose from 746 in January 1962 to over 3,400 by June; the entire U.S. commitment by the end of the year was 11,000, which included 29 U.S. Army Special Forces detachments. These advisory and support elements operated under the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, a position established 8 February 1962. The object of American military assistance was to counter the threat to the government of the Republic of Vietnam posed by the insurgency of an estimated 30,000 regular communist Viet Cong and civilian sympathizers among the population.65

  Many of the advisors in Vietnam were CIA operatives who, in conjunc
tion with U.S. Special Forces advisors, trained the CIA sponsored paramilitary Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). Concurrently, the U.S. Special Forces advisors were also engaged in training their Vietnamese counterparts.4 These largely ethnic Vietnamese originally came under the auspices of the Presidential Liaison Office, which was renamed the Presidential Survey Office in early 1962. In March 1963, after evidence of misuse by President Ngo Dinh Diem, they came under control of the military Joint Staff and were known as Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB), Vietnamese Special Forces.4 All of these were separate and distinct from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, or ARVN. To complicate matters, many of the groups were comprised of ethnic minorities; the various Montagnard tribes, Chinese Nungs, Hmong, Laotians and others, with a long enmity toward the ethnic Vietnamese that made up the ARVN and LLDB. From these early groups came several attempts at border and cross-border surveillance.4 The relative success of these early efforts is difficult to assess. The units operated in various strengths; without specific targets or objectives; without the benefit of air support; without reliable communication; and without the presence of advisory personnel on the ground. Many of these efforts involved simply drawing indigenous personnel from within target areas, briefing them, and sending them home to gather information.5

  Despite what appeared to be considerable successes in consolidating the population into organized local paramilitary defense forces to defend a series of strategic hamlets, the U.S. equipped Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness to close with the enemy. A corrupt government and bitterly contending Vietnamese political factions further hampered a cohesive prosecution of the war.65

  While the international community cast a blind eye to the growing involvement of the North, the South Vietnamese government, under President Ngo Dinh Diem, became increasingly more concerned with domestic unrest than with issues of national security, border surveillance and prosecution of a war. Diem’s brother and chief political advisor, Ngo Dinh Nhu, had commandeered the LLDB under his personal control and used them as his personal security force. On August 21st, 1963, several Special Forces ranger companies, acting on Nhu’s orders, attacked pagodas across the country and arrested more than 1400 Buddhists; many were beaten. Initially, the blame was placed on the Vietnamese Army because some of the rangers had worn borrowed ARVN paratrooper uniforms. When the truth became known, the LLDB took the heat. Not all of the ranger units had been involved, but all LLDB units were stood down and confined to base for a month while investigations continued. Washington, incensed by these abuses, applied pressure to Diem. The Pentagon recommended withholding of funds for any ranger unit remaining close to Saigon. They also recommended that the LLDB be relocated to Nha Trang under new orders to act as direct counterparts to the increasing U.S. Special Forces command there. Those ranger companies still close to Saigon were disbanded. Others that were not located near Saigon were not disbanded, but ordered to be rehabilitated. The overthrow of the Diem government in November, 1963 launched a revolving-door series of military led coalition governments. 4

  Cross border forays, effectively stalled for several months, once again came under consideration. Between November, 1963 and May 1964, The U.S. position on cross border missions alternated between approvals and disapprovals. This vacillation resulted from the conflicting positions of diplomats and the military on the manner in which a war should be prosecuted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff finally authorized MACV to begin planning jointly with the South Vietnamese for cross border operations.4

  What emerged was an ambitious MACV program called OPLAN 98-64. The plan called not only for aggressive covert ground patrolling in pursuit of evidence that the Communists were indeed using Laos as a primary means for infiltration, but it also called for interdiction tactics. In another interesting turn, MACV targeted the Tchepone area previously opposed by the United States Ambassador to Laos as a primary target area for intelligence gathering.4 MACV, through the LLDB Liaison Office, asked for volunteers from the Vietnamese Special Forces to man ten eight-man teams to conduct a thirty day operation in Laos. The volunteers were selected from a unit known as Group 31, a Vietnamese unit that was commanded by Major Pham Duy Tat. Group 31 had been training in the Da Nang area in preparation to participate in border surveillance operations. Four ranger companies that had been relocated or ‘rehabilitated’ after the coup in November 1963 were assigned as a regional reaction force near Dong Ba Thin, and would act as a reaction force for the reconnaissance elements as part of their duties. These four companies had been resurrected as the 11th Airborne Ranger Battalion and were commanded by Major Tran Ninh Huy. In late March, 1964, Captain William Richardson, MACV’s Special Forces Liaison for the teams working in III Corps, was approached by Major Mike Healy, 5th Special Forces Group Operations Officer, about becoming involved in the new project. 5

  Captain Richardson, a former prisoner of war in Korea and a veteran of the White Star program in Laos, was selected for the Project because of his wide range of experience and his demonstrated determination in completing difficult tasks. After the initial contact, Captain Richardson met with 5th Group Commanding Officer, Colonel Leonard, and his Deputy, LT Col. Vining. Richardson was tasked with putting together a camp to house the unit; selecting advisory staff to train and accompany cross border reconnaissance and interdiction teams; accomplishing the necessary training to insert the teams by parachute drop wearing protective smoke jumper clothing; and to be ready to go operational in one month. Richardson pointed out the aggressive time frame and insisted that insertion by helicopter would be much better operationally and logistically. He was directed that the infiltrations would be by parachute. After the requisite discussions, Richardson accepted the challenge and became the first member and commander of the new unit. Captain Richardson recognized that his new command was to be the first of its kind in this conflict and was expected to be truly representative of a modern diverse clandestine force capable of conducting its missions from the land, air and sea. Just as the three lightning bolts on the U.S. Army Special Forces insignia represented these avenues of infiltration, so, reasoned Richardson, did the three points of a triangle. He named the new unit Project Delta. 5

  CHAPTER III: LEAPING LENA

  Captain Richardson attacked this new responsibility with his trademark determination. He was given half an A-Team from Okinawa and supplanted those men with another half dozen men already in-country with the 5th Special Forces Group. Rapid construction began on a compound located at the end of the runway at Nha Trang. 5

  Along with the advisors, Captain Richardson received five Sikorsky H-34 helicopters and two C-47 aircraft assigned permanently to the Project. These aircraft were piloted by some of the finest pilots to be found anywhere. Trained by the U.S., these pilots were primarily Vietnamese, but also included at least one North Korean and one Chinese, who flew the C-47’s.

  Two U.S. SF personnel were assigned to each Vietnamese team and conducted vigorous training for the mission that included parachute drops into dense triple canopy jungle with all combat equipment, followed by several days of live fire patrolling exercises.