Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta Read online

  Team 3 made contact with an unknown size enemy force on September 28th and successfully broke contact and continued the mission. The next day the team detected three NVA tracking them toward their LZ. Team 3 called for an airstrike on their pursuers and a pair of jets delivered napalm on the targets. Upon reaching the LZ the team leader proceeded to brief the FAC on targets they had observed over the course of their mission. As Team 3 was extracted the FAC (LT Flanagan) directed air strikes on the identified targets resulting in several enemy killed and numerous secondary explosions.

  On October 1st Team 11, Burhl Cunningham and another American advisor, observed an estimated company of NVA performing calisthenics in a bivouac area and called for an air strike. Again an excited C&C ship repeatedly interrupted radio communications with, “What are they doing now?” After the air strikes Cunningham borrowed a phrase from his friend Schenk and reported that “Now they’re conducting first aid class.” It became a standard catch-all for “ the air strike was right on the money.” Enemy casualties were estimated to be 43 killed by air.36,37.92

  As successful as the recon teams were in identifying targets and directing air attacks on them, the Rangers had the opportunity to demonstrate their ability to engage the enemy in force with multiple Ranger companies and even with an outside CIDG force. Six Ranger operations were conducted, three of which involved more than one company. On September 29th and 30th, and on October 2nd and 3rd, 1966 the 3rd, 1st and 5th Companies of the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion conducted an operation to explore the estimated battalion sized base camp discovered by recon Team 9. The debriefing report that accompanied the After Action Report for these missions can be found in Appendix III.37

  As a direct result of the information gathered by Project Delta, the combined U.S. and South Vietnamese forces conducted the largest U.S. operation to date to find and destroy all enemy troops west of the Michelin rubber plantation near Tay Ninh. Dubbed Operation Attleboro, it began on October 15th, 1966 with combined forces of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the U.S 1st and 25th Infantry divisions, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, and at least two ARVN battalions totaling 20,000 troops at the height of the fighting. The fighting continued through the middle of November and was met with strong resistance from the 9th Viet Cong Division, one of the best trained Communist units in South Vietnam. Communist resistance was strong because the Tay Ninh area contained the principal VC comand center and the central office for the National Liberation Front known as the Central Organization for South Viet Nam (COSVN). By the end of the campaign over 2130 VC and NVA were confirmed killed. Over the course of the operations conducted from Song Be and Tay Ninh Project Delta provided ample intelligence to indicate that enemy troops were present in organized regimental strength and were committed to maintaining their strength in the area along the Cambodian border. The Allies defeated the enemy and, in what became a frequent occurrence, forced him back to his havens in Cambodia or Laos. 37

  The otherwise successful operation was marred by a tragic accident on September 28th when an L-19 air relay aircraft belonging to the 184th Aviation Company crashed on the FOB runway, killing the pilot. The Project Delta observer in the back seat of the L-19 was SFC Loy Brydon. He suffered two fractured legs and multiple lacerations to his neck and chest. He was medevaced to Cu Chi and on to Tan Son Nhut.37

  CHAPTER X: 1966; DISASTER AT KHE SANH

  Project Delta closed out 1966 with an operation conducted in two phases from an FOB in Khe Sanh. The Project was OPCON to the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), 3rd Marine Division. The first phase of the operation was conducted between October 14th and November 18th, 1966. During Phase I six Delta recon team missions, seven Roadrunner team missions, two Ranger missions and one mission involving CIDG personnel from Special Forces Camp Khe Sanh took place. The area of operations had been identified as having heavy concentrations of enemy troops by U.S. conventional units working there over the previous months. Project Delta recon teams found ample evidence of recent activity but observed no notable current activity. The Marines were conducting operations to the north of the recon area and it was surmised that the recent activity could have been reinforcements enroute to those battles. The significant engagement of this operation involved the 4th Airborne Ranger Company (LT Deaton, LT Lewis, SGT Spencer, SGT Dyer) on November 8th and 9th. On a routine search and destroy mission the 4th Company discovered a Montagnard village. Upon entering the village they came under fire. They returned fire, causing the Montagnards to drop their weapons and flee. A search of the village revealed several squad sized huts with reinforced bunkers beneath them. Hidden in the walls of the huts were ammunition and mines which exploded when the huts were burned. They also found women’s wigs and dresses, but no other indication that women had been present in the village. The village appeared to have been there for a long time and was probably a way station for troops in transit. The Rangers destroyed a large cache of rice and other food items and departed the village. They were taken under fire by an enemy platoon sized ambush. They immediately called for tactical air support and directed it at the enemy position. The enemy ambush site was well fortified with machine gun bunkers, trenches and huts. The enemy broke contact under intense air attack and the Rangers moved to an LZ for extraction. In the mean time, LT Col. Hayes and Major Tat (LLDB CO) led a force of CIDG into the area and linked with 4th Company. The next morning the Rangers returned to the village and completed the mission by burning the remaining huts and bunkers.38

  On November 9th, 1966 Air Force Captain Charles Swope, the newly arrived FAC pilot for the Project, departed the air field for a routine check on the teams. In the back seat was SFC Art Glidden, a Delta recon man. Ten minutes after takeoff radio communication with Captain Swope was lost. Two hours later a massive air search was begun. Late in the afternoon the wreckage of the O1E was spotted in the jungle, a puff of black smoke breaking through the trees. The Air Force pilot who discovered the wreckage reported that the plane was essentially intact but had been burned from rear of the windows forward and out a couple of feet on the wings. A recovery party led by SSG Tom Carpenter and SSG Tim O’Connor was quickly dispatched to the crash site. The pair were inserted without a radio due to a critical shortage. Their only contingency plan, thrown together on short notice with LT Flanagan, was that the pair would throw a WP grenade toward any enemy they encountered and mark their own position with a smoke grenade. That would give the FAC two points of reference to line up the jets or gunships for close air support. Fortunately no contact was made. The recovery team found SFC Glidden’s body about six feet from the aircraft near the right wing. Captain Swope’s body was still in the pilot’s seat. Both were badly burned. The recovery team secured the bodies as well as they could and placed them in body bags for the flight to Khe Sanh.38,36,92 Because of their limited time on the ground the recovery team was unable to conduct an extensive examination of the aircraft to determine any cause for the crash. On November 13th LT Col. Hayes, LT Lewis, SFC Winder, and SSG Spencer took a group of 14 CIDG into the crash site but were withdrawn almost immediately upon arrival because of bad weather. Nearly a month later, during Phase II of the operation, the wreckage was recovered and examined. There were numerous small holes in the fuselage that were .22 caliber or smaller. It was theorized that the NVA had fired a canister or fleshette round from a 75mm recoilless rifle, or something similar.36,39

  Arthur Glidden’s name is inscribed on Panel 12E, Line 47 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  Charles Swope’s name is inscribed on Panel 12E, Line 49 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  Phase II of Operation 13-66 was conducted from Khe Sanh between November 24th and December 24th, 1966. A total of three Delta Recon missions, five Delta Roadrunner missions, and four Ranger operations were conducted. The weather in I Corps remained miserable at best. Frequent heavy rain, low cloud cover, high winds and limited visibility made flying an on and off venture throughout the operation, especially for high speed aircraft u
sed for delivering tactical air strikes. The weather, along with other factors, would prove disastrous for this operation.

  The FOB at Khe Sanh reopened on November 24th. Recon Team 1 received their Operation Order (OPORD) on the 25th. All operations were postponed daily until November 29th. On the 29th Teams 1 (Russell “Pete” Bott and Willie Stark) and 10 (Andre St. Laurent and “Brownie” Browne), and Roadrunner Teams 102 and 104 were inserted at last light. Team 10 and the Roadrunners had only received their OPORDERSs that morning, conducted their brief backs that morning and performed an aerial reconnaissance of the AOs that same day. The insertion helicopters took off in the middle of fog patches, rain showers and low ceilings. After the insertions the pilots returned to the FOB and reported that they had encountered even worse weather in the teams’ AOs. They had been forced to fly low and navigate without the use of geographical navigation aids obscured by the clouds and rain. As they reviewed the maps in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) they came to the realization that they may have confused a rain swollen stream for a larger river that they counted on for orientation. If that was the case, they had inserted Team 1 into Laos.36 Ordinarily the helicopter pilots would have the prerogative to scrap a mission under such adverse conditions. In this case the entire Project was under intense pressure to conduct the operations. Equally unfortunate was the fact that the presence of U.S. troops on the ground in Laos was an extremely sensitive diplomatic issue for the U.S. There were, of course, U.S. troops operating in Laos under sterile conditions, meaning that they wore no identifying clothing, personal items, or equipment. These troops were from one of Project Delta’s sister units operating clandestinely under the auspices of MACV’s Studies and Observation Group (SOG). They, coincidentally, shared a launch site at Khe Sanh. Their air assets were all Vietnamese. Team 1 was instructed to move north and east. On the 30th Team 1 reported hearing voices near their location but continued the mission. A Ranger Company operation was postponed due to bad weather.

  On December 1st the Army radio relay team was up early and reported that the entire AO was socked in.36 Team 1 reported that they had just broken contact with an NVA tracking team of three enemy soldiers and requested immediate extraction. One of the trackers had gotten away. They were informed that extraction was not possible due to inclement weather.39 LTC Hayes was confronted by Doc Simpson, who told him that it was insane to leave the team in since one of the NVA had escaped and the team had no idea what their location actually was. Hayes, described as an arrogant control freak, called together the recon section and informed them that there would be more teams inserted despite the weather. Joe Alderman, perhaps the finest recon man to ever put boots on the ground, advised the CO that there was no point in putting more teams in because all they could do was run for their lives. No air support could fly and no extractions could be made. LTC Hayes called Joe Alderman a coward. Joe, to his credit, took it calmly and advised the LTC that he had several awards for valor and figured that was statement enough that he wasn’t a coward. Hayes was so infuriated that he selected three or four recon men that he labeled troublemakers and ordered them from the Project. The fact was that these were quality individuals that he couldn’t control. For the next few days Doc Simpson made sure that Joe Alderman had someone with him at all times to prevent him from doing something he might regret.92,94,97 Pete Bott asked when the FAC (LT Flanagan) would be up to give them a fix on their location. Without a known location they could easily be trapped by geographic features such as swollen rivers, cliffs, roads or even enemy base camps. The area they were in was a known regiment sized base area. They would soon find out they were right in the middle of it.

  Flanagan waited for the winds to subside to 20 knots on the morning of December 1st and then he proceeded to be briefed by Norm Doney, now the NCO in charge of the recon section, and the project CO, LTC Hayes.

  Doney assigned Jay Graves to ride the back seat with FAC and they departed in weather described as “dog shit”.36 The Bird Dog flew to an area that Flanagan suspected the team to be in and began to stutter the engine to get their attention. He got no response. The good news was that he was over the southeast corner of North Vietnam and the ground was crisscrossed with fresh trails and newly constructed bunkers and fighting positions. The back-seater spotted five NVA walking openly down a trail. Flanagan changed direction and within a few minutes was rewarded with radio contact with the team. The team guided him by sound over their location and LT Flanagan was able to identify their position, relay the grid coordinates to them and warn them of NVA activity all around them. On his way back to the FOB Flanagan contacted flight control for a weather update and was told that the weather would only get worse for the next few days with winds as high as fifty knots. The bad news got worse; no tactical air support assets could take off or land in the current conditions. Team 1 was in deep trouble. They were confirmed to be in Laos in the middle of a regimental base area. They could not expect to be extracted or to get any tactical air support because of the weather.36 It would get worse.

  On the morning of December 2nd Team 1 reported that they had been in contact again and that one American was wounded. They believed that they were surrounded. Six helicopters from the 281st scrambled and headed for the team’s last known position. On board was SGT Irby Dyer III, a Delta medic and veteran of several Ranger operations.

  They called the FOB shortly and asked for the FAC to help them find the team. The helicopters were having difficulty navigating in the low overcast. LT Flanagan grabbed his gear and headed for the flight line. He was joined quickly by Tom Tucker, an NCO from Recon. Flanagan tried to dissuade Tucker to no avail. The two climbed into the Bird Dog and took off for the AO. Several minutes later they managed to avoid colliding with two mountains and rendezvoused with the helicopters. Flanagan directed the helicopters to an area away from his flight path to avoid collisions while trying to pinpoint the team. He was able to establish contact with Pete Bott and be guided over his location. He flew very low, at 300 feet, and drew no enemy fire. He asked Bott to throw a smoke grenade to identify his location for the rescue ships. Bott complied and the rescue ship homed in on a small clearing with four bodies lying prone in some elephant grass.

  As the rescue ship flared into the clearing the elephant grass was thrown back from dozens of hidden bunker locations and the helicopter came under intense automatic weapons fire. It had been a trap and the team was the bait. As the rescue ship took fire, the gunships attacked the enemy positions with everything they had. In the matter of a few short seconds the rescue ship gained 300 feet of altitude and slowly turned and nosed into the hillside. The helicopter exploded and burned on impact. Their ordnance and fuel expended, the helicopters were forced to leave the scene. LT Flanagan tried desperately to get air support without success. He then decided that any hope the team had lay in his hands. He began an air assault on the gun positions armed only with a few rockets and some smoke grenades. Tommy Tucker fired his CAR-15 and threw hand grenades. They conducted tree top level strafing runs until their ordnance was gone and then circled to try and make radio contact with the air crew or the recon team. They were met with silence. They flew over the team’s last known position and saw that the little clearing was empty. The team had vanished. They returned to Khe Sanh. The wind and rain caused the runway to be slick and the Bird Dog was blown from one side of the runway to the other as it it was forced to abort its first attempt to land. The second attempt was successful.36

  Andre St. Laurent’s Team 10 was extracted on the 2nd. Project Delta was informed by the 3rd Marine Division that no further rescue attempts would be made without the express permission of their Commanding General. Despite specific instructions to the contrary, LT Flanagan and Captain Al Groth, the newly arrived replacement for Captain Swope, would continue the search for the team for several days. On the 5th they discovered a red signal panel and directed rescue ships to pick up the only two team members ever heard from again. The two LLDB were able to escape when
LT Flanagan threw his yellow smoke grenades near the trapped team. The NVA apparently thought an air strike was coming and ducked under cover of their bunkers. The LLDB used the distraction to evade. They tried to get the two Americans to follow but Pete Bott was last seen waving them off as he cradled Willie Stark’s head on his thigh. The LLDB said that Stark was wounded in the chest and leg and couldn’t move. Pete Bott refused to leave him.36

  What followed was a series of air attacks orchestrated by the two Delta FACs. They spent a lot of time seeking targets of opportunity and exploiting them with tactical air. With the aid of Delta Recon men as back seat observers and spotters, the two FACs did serious damage to enemy assets in the AO. One of their targets was the 75mm recoilless rifle that had killed Captain Swope the month before. Using one FAC as bait to draw the enemy fire, the second FAC identified the gun placement and destroyed it with air attacks.36,38 Flanagan would leave the Project after this operation and continue his career. Captain Al Groth, having survived his baptism of fire with Delta, would become a much respected member of this small band of warriors and come to be known as The Great White Hunter.

  In the debriefing of the two LLDB from Team 1, it was revealed that one of the team members, as they fled the ambush site, heard an enemy soldier say something to the effect of “here they are, tie his hands, we will take them this way.”30 Pete Bott and Willie Stark were carried as Missing in Action (MIA) until they were declared dead in 1978. Many people, including Norm Doney, believe that Pete and Willie were captured and may have survived captivity for many years.30